Postcommunist transformation has led to quite different results. The starkest example is Russia, which has become a thriving market economy with an average real growth of 7 percent a year for a decade from 1999 to 2008, but Freedom House (2008) ranks it as a "not free" or authoritarian state. In this article, I define what I mean by saying that Russia is a market economy but not democratic. To clarify how this happened, I shall compare democracy to policymaking with regard to a market economy in the years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which I consider to have undergone a revolution. Finally, I shall consider the contradiction that has arisen between an increasingly authoritarian state and an ever wealthier market economy. My argument is that this contradiction is too great to last for long.

We report results from two original surveys of 500 firms conducted in 2000 and 2007 in eight regions in Russia that explore the business environment for manufacturing and service sector firms. We find that the formal and informal rules of the game for everyday firms in Russia have changed dramatically in the Putin years. Most importantly, while the informal and formal rules of the game in 2000 were quite similar for firms that were investing and those that were not, in 2007 regional governments had come to favor the former through a variety of informal and formal means. This shift in the rules of the game in favor of firms that invest suggests that a core group of firms in the regions under study have managed to cooperate with the regional government to temper the weak institutional environment in Russia, but also that the playing field for businesses in Russia is not level.

As a mono-energy-economy, Russia’s fortunes are closely linked to the price of energy. That same link explains why when energy prices hit record highs, there was such strong public support for Vladimir Putin. But when energy prices plummeted in late 2008, Russia found itself with an economic downturn which brought with it, factory closings, worker layoffs and political grumbling. Because of Russia’s inexperience with economic upheaval, Russia is likely to go through greater turmoil and political uncertainty if not unrest, than more traditional market economies which over the years have had to learn how to deal with economic cycles of this sort.

Based on a set of interviews and materials collected in Barnaul (Siberia) in 2001-2005, this article explores discursive mechanisms through which new social realities and new social identities are imagined, negotiated, and internalized in postsocialist Russia. By analyzing popular conspiracy narratives about universal lie, corruption, and manipulation, the article draws attention to the increasing prominence of images and ideas of an enclosed national community that are used to counterbalance the perceived exposure to foreign values and capital after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The economic crisis has created a basically new situation. Russia should reduce its geopolitical ambitions, which have emerged in the last few years, as well as its national budget. The illusions of might, based on the possession of expensive commodities that everyone needs, are fading. There is no doubt that in a couple of years the demand for energy resources will grow again. But until then, Russia will have to go through another period of difficulties, whose outcome is not clear. Depending on its outcome, Putin's epoch will be viewed either as a time of lost opportunities, or as the eve of a real revival of Russia as a modern great power.

When Putin became president at the beginning of the 21st century, Russia was in shambles. Putin saw his task to be two fold. First, to recreate the Russian state – that had been seriously weakened by Boris Yeltsin. Second, he set out to reestablish Russia as an important international actor. His approach to dealing with those two tasks was heavily influenced by his approach to dealing with political problems. He is determined, but non ideological. He believes that Russia is unique and that only "Russian" solutions will resolve the country’s problems. Most of all, Putin sees himself as a "problem solver," something that comes from his years in the KGB. And while much remains to be done, he did a lot to solve Russia’s problems. The power of the state has been restored, and Russia is taken far more seriously on the international stage than it was in 2000. What is amazing, given all of the criticism he has received in the West for his "undemocratic" actions, his standings in the polls for the eight years he was in office remained above 70%, something a Western politician can only dream of.

The paper gives an overview of the Russian higher education history, outlines its current state, the challenges and opportunities for its modernization in the nearest future. A special emphasis is made on the role of international cooperation in the higher education development and prospects for Russia’s integration into the global educational space. Andrei Kortunov is President of the Moscow based New Eurasia Foundation. He has managed a number of education-focused programs in Russia, working closely with governmental agencies, higher education institutions, international consultancies and foreign foundations.

The article surveys Russia’s regional and centre-periphery developments and their wider implications for the country’s political, economic, and territorial future. In particular, it discusses President Putin’s federalism and local government interventions and takes stock of the outcome of these and other relevant federal initiatives. The paper also discusses the broader implications of authoritarian state-building for the country’s social, economic, and territorial cohesion. Globalization-related external influences on regional economies and politics are also discussed and the significance of the hitherto largely neglected variable of geography in shaping the nature and intensity of these influences is highlighted. Using examples from China and India, the paper shows how globalization may have highly uneven economic and political regional impacts in territorially large countries. The paper suggests that in Russia, external influences from regional political and economic players such as the EU, other Western donors, or multinational corporations may impinge upon authoritarian tendencies however they are only bound to increase regional socio-economic and political divergence given their spatially uneven nature.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has become a global city with a vibrant urban and cultural life-one of the most expensive capitals in the world with famous clubs and restaurants, as well as one of the most popular destinations for city workers and diplomats. Has corruption been instrumental in Moscow's development? The answer is complicated and in many ways a matter of definitions. It depends on whether one considers informal practices-inherited from Soviet times as well as new ones-as corrupt and how one conceptualizes corruption. I will illustrate some of these complications for the case of the Soviet practice of blat, explain its "monetization" and its evolving relationship with corruption in the post-Soviet transition, and analyze the role of informal networks in present-day Russia.

The Russian Orthodox Church, the biggest centralized religious institution in the post-Soviet space, has been going through major changes in the 2000s. These are connected to qualitative changes in the composition of believers and clergy as well as legal registration of rights on church property obtained from the government in the 1990s. This has led to substantial changes in internal policies, particularly a sharp decrease in the influence of fundamentalists, which had been rising over the previous decade. Moreover, the years of Putin's rule were years of failure in the church's relations with the government, which consistently denied the ROC's most important requests. In this paper we will examine the principal social developments that have been taking place within the Church in the first years of the twenty-first century.

According to the 2002 census, the Muslim population of Russia was 14.5 million people. During the past decade, the idea of a Muslim demographic "threat" has spread, discussed most often by politicians with nationalist views, along with journalists and some writers. Islam remains a factor that regulates relations in society. The current revival of Islam is contradictory and diverse in terms of its consequences. Its main result is that we are dealing with a new Islam and new Muslims.

The collective historical amnesia that reigns in contemporary Russia demands an explanation. In the first part of my article I will analyze the mechanisms that suppress historical memory. I will focus my attention on two historical representations of critical relevance for this matter. First, I will discuss the Western-oriented ideology of the post-Soviet intelligentsia. Second, I will analyze the functioning of the myth of the "Great Patriotic War." In the second part of my paper I will address the influence of historical amnesia on contemporary Russian society. Deep distortions in moral judgments and social relations resulting from suppressed memory will be studied through an analysis of contemporary Russian fiction, especially fantasy. Finally, I will consider Russian Gothic society, which originates in historical amnesia.